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EU trade policy  
Stephen Woolcock 
 
Introduction 
EU trade policy faces a number of challenges.  It must define and prosecute a 
common policy for all 27 Member States (MS).  It must seek to balance offensive, 
market opening objectives in manufactures and services against defensive interests in 
agriculture and some industrial and service sectors.  In addition to these market access 
issues it must seek to define and promote European norms in international 
negotiations on trade-related rulemaking on such topics as investment and the links 
between trade and the environment.  EU policy must also decide when and how to use 
the leverage of trade to pursue other objectives, such as foreign or security policy. All 
this must be done while retaining a balance between efficiency, defined here as the 
ability to reach and pursue common positions in negotiations with third parties, and 
democratic control or accountability. (Meunier and Nicolaides, 2006) 
 
The EU’s response to these challenges has evolved over the past 50 years.  Initially 
trade policy served the primary aim of building Europe in the sense of defending the 
tariff preference for EU Member States created by the customs union and the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) against US efforts during the Kennedy Round 
(1962-69) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to reduce most 
favoured nation (MFN) tariffs and liberalise agriculture.1 During the Tokyo Round of 
the GATT (1973-79) EU trade policy had to defend the policy space sought by 
Member States that retained mixed economies. Until the 1980s there were still 
considerable differences between the offensive (market opening) and defensive 
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(protectionist) interests of Member States, which meant that EU trade policy was still 
largely the sum of national policies. During the 1980s the creation of a single 
European market and the associated strengthening on the acquis communautaire 
resulted in more genuine common policies. This stronger acquis then constituted the 
starting point for EU trade policies.  This broader ‘domestic (.i.e. EU) base of 
common EU policies, went hand-in-hand with a shift towards a more proactive and 
liberal EU trade policy that was also more supportive of a rules-based multilateral 
trading system.  During the Uruguay Round (1986-94) the EU shared a duopoly of 
leadership of the GATT with the US that helped bring about considerable progress in 
creating the rules-based, multilateral system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).   
 
By the mid 1990s the EU was seeking to initiate a new multilateral trade round.  But 
the EU’s views on a comprehensive agenda were not fully shared by the US and 
developing countries.  With the rise of China, the growing economic strength of India 
and a more cohesive coalition of developing countries led by Brazil and India the 
trading system had become multi-polar by the late 1990s. (Young and Peterson. 2006) 
Without active support from the USA the EU has not been very successful in shaping 
the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations (2001 - ).  From 2006 the 
EU has therefore followed the trend, initiated by the US and other major countries, 
towards the more active use of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) to pursue its 
trade policy objectives.2   
 
The different dimensions to EU trade policy 
There are different dimensions to EU trade policy, as in the case of all countries. The 
importance and objectives pursued on each dimension or level will vary over time. 
Although EU trade policy is influenced by liberal arguments favouring unilateral 
liberalisation, this level is really limited to unilaterally offering preferential market 
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access or zero tariffs for least developed countries under the WTO General System of 
Preferences (GSP) scheme or the EU’s own Everything But Arms (EBA) policy. 
 
EU bilateral trade policy takes the form of Association Agreements or free trade 
agreements with third countries.  Trade and trade-related topics also form the core of 
the currently ‘in vogue,’ but not especially effective region-to-region agreements 
negotiated with other regions that are intended to serve the dual aim of market 
opening for EU exporters and the promotion of integration within the partner region.  
 
Plurilateral agreements, such as the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
or Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft under the aegis of the WTO, or various 
agreements on investment under the aegis of the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) are negotiated by the EU (or its Member States) with 
like-minded or similarly developed countries on specialist topics. 
 
The multilateral dimension of EU trade policy centres on the WTO and takes the form 
of multilateral rounds of negotiation such as the Doha Development Agenda. But it is 
important not to forget work in a range of WTO committees concerned with 
implementation, the review of WTO Members trade policies (Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism), including the review of preferential trade agreements in the WTO’s 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, and dispute settlement. Each bilateral or 
region-to-region agreement also involves ongoing work on implementation and the 
settlement of disputes. 
 
Finally, EU trade policy includes the application of so-called commercial instruments, 
such as anti-dumping (under Art VI of the GATT 1994 when exporters ‘dump’ 
products on the EU market, i.e. sell at prices below the cost of production); safeguards 
(under Art XIX of the GATT 1994 and special safeguard measures in bilateral trade 
agreements) to limit ‘injury’ to industries as a result of unforeseen import surges) and 
other measures aimed at addressing cases of ‘unfair trade’ such the Trade Barriers 
Regulation (TBR) (Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94). 
 
Towards a comprehensive EU trade policy 
Trade policy is an area in which the EU, as opposed to the Member States, has 
considerable influence on the international scene thanks to the EU3 exclusive 
competence for trade4 and the size and depth of the single European market.  But it 
has taken many years to establish a comprehensive policy. This section considers how 
treaty changes and domestic policy developments as well as external factors have 
played a role in the creation of such a comprehensive, common EU trade policy.  
 
The treaty provisions 
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The treaty of Rome, as amended, provides for exclusive EU competence for ‘common 
commercial policy’ in Article 133 (TEC) (ex Art 113) and sets out the decision-
making processes,5 which start with a Commission proposal on the agenda and 
negotiating aims. This is discussed in the 133 Committee and if necessary the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), before the Council authorises the 
Commission to negotiate ‘in consultation with the Member States (MSs).’  This 
‘mandate’ is not time-limited, but can be adjusted by the Council as negotiations 
proceed. The results of the negotiation are adopted by the Council and must in certain 
case (see below under policy process) have the assent of the European Parliament 
(EP).  Ratification at MS level is required for mixed or national competence issues.  
There are slightly different treaty provisions for bilateral or preferential agreements, 
such as association agreements. Here adoption of an agreement requires unanimity 
(Article 310 TEC) (ex Art 238) in the Council and assent by the European Parliament 
in all cases.  
 
The Treaty of Rome did not provide an exhaustive definition of ‘common commercial 
policy.’  In 1958 trade policy was essentially limited to tariffs, so these are mentioned 
as were agriculture and anti-dumping. But otherwise competence (whether European 
Community or Member State) has been at issue whenever new topics appeared on the 
trade agenda. The decision to create a customs union did, however, require the 
original member states jointly to set tariffs and to develop a collective trade policy as 
they did in the Kennedy Round. As the trade agenda expanded the EU was called 
upon to negotiate an ever wider range of topics, such technical barriers to trade 
(TBTs), subsidies and countervailing duties (SCVs), and public procurement 
(Government Procurement Agreement) during the Tokyo Round and services 
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(General Agreement on Trade in Services or GATS), investment (Trade Related 
Investment Measures or TRIMs) and intellectual property (Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights or TRIPs) in the Uruguay Round (1986-94). (Woolcock and Hodges 
1996). In response to what was in effect an external and largely US-driven trade 
agenda member state governments pragmatically accepted that the Commission 
should act as the negotiator for the EU as a whole and were willing to leave aside the 
issue of legal competence until the ratification stage of negotiations.  
 
Trade competence has featured in all recent Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). 
In the Maastricht IGC the Commission pressed for increased EC competence to 
include services, investment and intellectual property rights on the grounds that these 
were part of the package of issues being negotiated in the Uruguay Round, but this 
was resisted by MS concerns about loss of sovereignty.  The MSs also went out of 
their way to keep trade policy within the control of the technocratic policy elite of 
senior national and Commission trade officials and the EP at arms-length.  In the 
Amsterdam IGC renewed Commission pressure for increased competence led to a 
modest compromise in the shape of the Art 133(5) (TEC) enabling clause. This 
enables the Council, acting unanimously, to add a specific issue, such as services, to 
EC competence without having to go through a formal treaty change. This provision 
has, to date, never been used.  The 2001 Treaty of Nice (ToN) added some service 
activities to EC competence, but excluded sensitive services sectors such as audio 
visual.  The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) if ratified would confirm the existing provisions 
and procedures of Art 133 (TEC)(in Art 207 ToL), but would make all trade policy 
exclusive EU6 competence, dispensing with mixed (EC and MS) competence and thus 
the requirement for mixed agreements to be ratified by MS parliaments.7   
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The formal treaty provisions governing EU trade policy have therefore evolved over 
half a century and have been mostly concerned with competence issues rather than 
how trade policy is made.  However, the Treaty of Lisbon if ratified would also affect 
a change in the latter by granting the EP greater powers. (see the section on policy 
process below) Simply considering treaty changes as a result of intergovernmental 
negotiations would however, affords only a limited understanding of the evolution 
towards a comprehensive EU trade policy.  Developments in the ‘domestic’ EU 
policies, including how domestic policies have responded to external factors, have 
been more important. 
 
The impact of the acquis communautaire on EU trade policy 
Apart from a common external tariff (CET) and CAP, there were in the 1960s and 70s 
large areas of trade and trade-related policies on which there was no common EU 
policy. It was not until the late 1960s that the EU introduced common commercial 
instruments such as anti-dumping and safeguard provisions. With the rise of new 
protectionism in the early 1970s the individual MS made use of the scope under Art 
115 (EEC) to maintain national import quotas for textiles and clothing from low cost 
developing countries and national ‘voluntary’ export restraint agreements (VERs) 
outside of any formal trade rules to limit imports from the Japan and the Newly 
Industrialising Countries (NICs) of such products as cars, consumer electronics and 
machine tools. 
 
Throughout the 1970s MS also pursued national champion policies to bolster the 
competitiveness of national companies through the use of subsidies, preferential 
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government procurement, technical regulations and standards and the (non-
)application of competition policy.  As a result the Commission was obliged to defend 
the ‘policy space’ of the MS in the face of US pressure to impose multilateral 
discipline on such policies. Only in the case of the iron and steel, where the EU had 
greater powers under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty was 
there a more common EU policy. (Woolcock, 1982) 
 
During the 1980s the picture changed considerably due to the realisation of a genuine 
Single European Market (SEM).  Agricultural reform, in the shape of the 1991 
proposals put forward by the Commissioner for Agriculture, McSharry, to reduce the 
more trade distorting price support mechanisms of the CAP, came rather too late to 
help in the Uruguay Round (Hodges and Woolcock, 1996), but in many other fields 
the SEM reforms facilitated the emergence of a more comprehensive, more rules-
based and liberal EU policy.  For example, the elimination of frontier controls with 
the SEM made the continuation of national quotas and VERs impossible and loosened 
the grip of defensive interests enough to facilitate EU support for a ban of such 
measures. (Hanson, 1998)  Stricter enforcement of the existing EU rules on national 
subsidies provided the model for the subsidy rules of WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Duties.  In the field of government procurement, where the EU 
had previously blocked US attempts to open the EU power and telecommunications 
markets, the adoption of a full panoply of EU Directives brought virtually all public 
procurement under EU rules and facilitated a more positive EU position in the 
plurilateral negotiations on a revised Government Purchasing Agreement in the WTO. 
(Woolcock, 2008)  In services the SEM liberalised a first group of more market-
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related sectors, such as telecommunications and financial services, which again 
facilitated a more proactive EU stance in the GATS negotiations.  
 
Generally speaking, moves towards a more liberal, rules-based regime in the Uruguay 
Round came as a result of US and EU cooperation.  Where the support of either was 
lacking, there was less progress, such as in agriculture due to limited EU support, or 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) due to US antipathy to rules that followed the EU 
model and went beyond the basic GATT principle of non-discrimination or national 
treatment. In services the EU overtook8 the US as the main driver of the GATS with 
the US holding back conclusion of an agreement because it sought more commitments 
from emerging markets. (Hoekman and Sauve, 1994)    
 
The SEM and the development of the acquis had a threefold effect on the EU policy 
process in trade.  The SEM liberalised and thus gave the Commission negotiators 
more flexibility to seek ambitious reciprocal trade agreements.  At the same time the 
deepening and widening9 of the EU market enhanced the economic power the EU.  In 
GATT trade negotiations on tariffs and to a less extent services, the ability to 
withhold market access is a reasonable measure of power. Finally, the adoption of 
common policies in the shape of the acquis gave EU negotiators an agreed basis for 
negotiating international rules and norms in the WTO or bilaterally. 
 
To the norms codified in the acquis, one must add a number of more general EU 
normative values shaping its trade policy.  First, the belief, based on the European 
experience, that market integration cannot stop with national treatment and the 
removal of border measures, but requires positive integration or at least agreement on 
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a range of trade-related topics.  This is reflected in the EU’s search for a 
comprehensive trade agenda in the WTO and - for the most part - in the preferential 
agreements it negotiates.  Second, the belief - again based on the EU experience - that 
regional economic integration has considerable economic and political benefits.  This 
is why the EU favours region-to-region agreements to promote regional integration in 
other regions and why the EU has become the ‘patron saint of inter-regionalism in 
international relations.’ (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2005).  Third, the acquis codifies an 
approach in which liberalisation takes place, but within a framework of agreed rules 
that protect competition, the environment and other legitimate social policy 
objectives.  This has also shaped the EU desire for a comprehensive agenda to include 
trade-related topics for reasons of governance as well as to enhance market access. 
(Baldwin, 2006; Lamy 2004)  
 
Enlargement has had less of an impact than one might have expected given the more 
than doubling of MS. The Nordic enlargement of 1995 brought in liberal-minded 
Sweden and Finland, and Sweden soon established itself as one of the leading 
proponents of liberal trade and investment in the Council and 133 Committee, thus 
consolidating the liberal trend established during the second half of the 1980s and first 
half of the 1990s.10   
 
The eastern enlargement on 2004 is generally considered to have been neutral in 
terms of the balance of protectionist and liberal Member States, with the more 
protectionist Poland with concerns about agricultural being balanced by the generally 
far more liberal smaller MS.  Estonia was, for example, obliged to make its trade 
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policy more protectionist in order to bring it in line with the acquis. The new 
members were in any case obliged to accept the existing EU trade regime.   
 
External factors have also driven EU trade policy towards greater comprehensiveness. 
From the origins of the GATT in the late 1940s until well into the 1980s the 
international trade agenda, if not always the outcome of negotiations, was shaped by 
the US.  In the 1960s this took the form of pressure for tariff reductions and 
negotiations on agriculture to limit the impact of the CET and the CAP on US 
exporting interests. In the 1970s it took the form adding trade-related topics, such as 
subsidies and government procurement, to the agenda in an effort to extend GATT 
discipline the ‘unfair’ competition resulting from the use of such instruments by 
Europe and Japan.  In the 1980s it took the form of getting services, intellectual 
property and investment on the GATT agenda, because these topics reflected the US 
competitive advantage in financial services, communications, high 
technology/research-based products and the media.  
 
As discussed above, until the 1980s the EU response to these US initiatives was 
defensive. Faced with the ‘challenge’ of the US, EU Member States responded 
pragmatically and agreed that negotiating with one voice through the Commission 
was in the EU’s best interest.  The Commission was thus given the role of negotiating 
on a range on topics, but without prejudice to the formal de jure competence question.  
Once agreements had been negotiated it was then necessary to resolve the legal 
competence question in order to know how the agreements were to be adopted and 
implemented. At the end of the Tokyo Round a political agreement was reached on 
joint signature by the EC and the Member States. (Bourgeoise, 1982) At the end of 
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the Uruguay Round the General Affairs Council first decided, in March 1994, that the 
Council Presidency, Commission and MS should all sign the Marrakesh Agreement 
that concluded the Uruguay Round.  The German presidency along with France and 
Britain then suggested a code of conduct for dealing with issues of mixed 
competence.  But The Commission supported by Belgium was concerned that this 
would set an intergovernmental precedent and prejudice the forthcoming 
(Amsterdam) IGC in which the Commission was seeking increased EU competence. 
So the Commission referred the issue to the European Court of Justice, which in its 
1/94 decision lent rather more towards the MS than the Commission position. 
(Devuyst, 1995) 
 
The fact that the Commission was given the job of negotiating meant it built 
negotiating capacity, expertise and institutional memory that helped it to 
progressively establish de facto competence for the wider, comprehensive trade 
agenda. The Commission and the EU as a whole thus became recognised more and 
more as the focus of trade policy by the major actors.  In this way external factors 
contributed to the emergence of a progressively more comprehensive EU trade policy.  
  
The policy process  
The EU’s response to the challenges mentioned in the introduction depends on 
process, or how decisions are made, as well as substantive policy issues and interests 
at stake within the EU and internationally.  The Commission has established itself as 
the agent for the EU in international trade negotiations and the MS governments have, 
at least to date, served as the main principals, but what is the nature of the relationship 
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between them and how, if at all, has the EU responded to the greater pressure for 
accountability in trade policy decision making?   
 
The Council decides on the EU objectives 
In multilateral negotiations, notably within the WTO, the Commission produces a 
draft mandate, drawing on the positions of the member governments and the views of 
business, civil society and resolutions or reports from the European or national 
parliaments.11 The Commission rarely works from a blank sheet.  In addition to the 
domestic acquis, trade negotiations often form part of an iterative process, so that 
positions adopted in previous rounds will inform current EU positions. Continuity is 
ensured by a strong institutional memory stored within the Commission and national 
trade administrations. The Commission’s draft mandate is discussed in the Article 133 
Committee, which consists of senior trade officials from each member government, 
and is chaired by the rotating Council presidency. The formal mandate is then adopted 
by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). See figure x.1.  The 
European Parliament has no formal role in mandating or authorizing negotiations.  It 
has only the possibility of shaping opinion by debating the topics and passing 
resolutions or adopting reports on specific trade topics.12  The adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty would not change this as Art 218(2) ToL clearly states that it is the Council 
that would retain the right to authorise negotiations and determine the mandate.13 The 
mandate is not time-limited. For example, the EU negotiated the DDA on a formal 
mandate adopted in 1999 before the Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting.  But the 
mandate can be and is adjusted as negotiations proceed. 
 
The Commission negotiates 
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The Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU in consultation with the member 
governments, mostly through the regular meetings of the Article 133 Committee. 
(Johnson, 1998)  In negotiations with the EU’s trading partners the Commission is the 
only member of the EU delegation to speak, although national officials from member 
governments are present in formal negotiations. This is the case for topics on which 
the EU has competence, as well as in trade negotiations in which there is mixed or 
national competence. The Commission is expected to report to the MS on important 
informal contacts with the EU’s trading partners, for example, to exchange 
information. There is a grey area here in the sense that there is no clear dividing line 
between exchanging information and negotiations. If the negotiations are in Geneva, 
where the WTO has its headquarters, MS are represented by officials drawn from the 
national delegations to the WTO or experts from national capitals. At key junctures in 
negotiations or at WTO Ministerial Meetings, member governments are represented at 
ministerial level. 
 
Figure x.1 EU decision-making processes for multilateral trade negotiations  
 
The Council can direct the Commission on any issue during negotiations, but in most 
cases new initiatives or changes result from Commission proposals which are then 
discussed in the Article 133 Committee. If the position proposed by the Commission 
does not have sufficient support, the chair will refer the matter back to the 
Commission. Although QMV is provided for in the treaty, the Article 133 Committee 
hardly ever takes a formal vote but favours consensus. The prospect of a vote based 
on a QMV means however, that MS go to considerable lengths to avoid being so 
isolated and thus faced with being outvoted.   
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The central dynamic of EU trade policy lies in the interaction between the 
Commission and the Council/Article 133 Committee. The principal – agent model in 
which the Member State governments are the principals and the Commission the 
agent seems to capture what happens better than the executive/legislative model of the 
US, because the Council does not really behave like a legislature, authorizing the 
executive Commission to negotiate. The member governments do not only set the 
objectives and ratify the results, but also take a close interest in the progress of 
negotiations. This is slightly different from the US system of Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA), formerly ‘fast track’, in which Congress delegates constitutional 
powers to negotiate commercial policy to the executive and must therefore accept or 
reject, but cannot amend what is negotiated.  Although the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) has to be very sensitive to Congressional opinion, because it 
must have majority support for the final package, it probably has more negotiating 
flexibility or ‘agency slack’ than the Commission vis-à-vis member governments. 
This is because the latter intervene directly over negotiating tactics and the 
composition of the final package deal. The fact that consensus is the norm for 
adopting the results of negotiations in the EU also reduces agency slack. The EU 
system works well when communication between the Commission and the member 
governments is effective and when the Commission is seen as a credible, trusted 
negotiator by its principals, the member governments.  The degree of agent slack will 
however, vary from topic to topic. Generally speaking the Commission will be 
granted more flexibility (agent slack) on technical issues than for politically sensitive 
issues. The Commission will therefore generally wish to deal with issues by means of 
technical discussions on details in the 133 Committee. Any Member State(s) not 
Deleted: want to have a say in 
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happy with how the Commission deals with the issue in the 133 Committee will 
therefore seek to ‘politicise’ the issue and threaten to initiate a discussion on the issue 
in the Council. The normal practice would be for most trade issues to be approved by 
the Council but without discussion.14  
 
As the key principals, the ideological stance of MS on trade is a factor. But some 
caution is called for when categorizing member governments as liberal or 
protectionist. Positions are also significantly shaped by sector interests, domestic 
political factors, such as which government is in power, not to mention economic and 
electoral cycles. For example, Ireland is liberal on trade in manufacturing, investment, 
and services, but protectionist on agriculture. France is protectionist on agriculture, 
but liberal on services, except audio-visual services. Germany is generally liberal on 
trade in goods, but less so on the liberalization of agriculture or services. Generally 
speaking, Sweden has tended to occupy the liberal end of the spectrum and France is 
at the other protectionist end. The UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and 
Germany tend to adopt liberal positions, whereas Italy, Spain, and Portugal are more 
protectionist, with the other member states in swing positions. France also tends to see 
itself as providing the backbone for the EU trade policy in the sense of holding out 
against pressure from other countries, especially the US. 
 
Successive enlargements EU have influenced this pattern. UK accession meant that 
EU policy would in future be shaped by a state that has deep liberal trade traditions. 
Portuguese and Spanish accession tipped the balance towards protectionism, 
especially in sectors such as steel and textiles, whereas Nordic enlargement in 1994 
shifted the centre of gravity towards a more liberal position. The 2004 enlargement to 
Deleted: ¶
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include central and east European countries as well as Cyprus and Malta has on 
balance proved to be relatively neutral. Whilst Poland and Slovakia have sectors they 
will wish to protect, there are liberal countervailing forces in Estonia, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary.  There is also not much evidence of enlargement 
bringing about changes, or making decision making harder. The 133 Committee (and 
Council) have become much larger, which has made dialogue harder. At the same 
time a larger Committee appears to have strengthened the hand of the Commission as 
initiator and drafter of policy positions. (Elsig, 2008) The smaller MS tend to be 
relatively inactive except on a few key issues. As they do not have strong views on 
many issues these smaller MS also tend to support the Commission proposal. This has 
the added benefit of preserving the limited political capital they have for those things 
that are really of central national importance on which they want Commission 
support.    
  
The Commission and Council consult the EP, and this has become more formal with 
the establishment of the International Trade Committee (INTA) in 2004.  There is a 
growing acceptance among policy makers that ‘trade can no longer operate in a 
hermetically sealed box’, but must be more open to scrutiny and debate. (Baldwin, 
2006, pg 941) Although, the adoption of provisions equivalent to those in the Lisbon 
Treaty would formalise this and require the Commission to report regularly to the 
INTA on the progress of negotiations (Art 207(3) LT), the Art 133 Committee would 
remain more important and continue with its existing role of assisting the 
Commission in negotiations.    
 
No real formal channels for NGO stakeholders 
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The EU policy process like all trade policy is shaped by sector or interest groups, but 
there is no formal channel for representation on a par with, for example, The US 
Trade Advisory Committees. The EU Economic and Social Committee (and 
Committee of the Regions) are consulted but, rightly or wrongly, are not taken very 
seriously by the policy makers or stakeholders.  Over the past 50 years there has been 
considerable spill-over with business and, since the late 1990s, civil society NGOs, 
making more and more representations at the EU level. 
 
The Commission is happy to hear the views of business.  Indeed, the need for private 
sector input in order to define the EU’s offensive and defensive objectives has, on 
occasion, led the Commission to encourage the creation of new EU level business 
representation where it did not previously exist, such as the creation of ESF (The 
European Services Forum) in the late 1980s.  The Commission favours EU level 
representation at both the sector and confederation level, and can easily fend off 
lobbying from sector interests in one or only a couple of Member States on the 
grounds that this is not representative of the EU-wide interest. (Woll, 2007) The need 
for representation to take place at the EU level necessitates common positions among 
national sector interests and thus makes for a more institutionalized lobbying through 
EU level sector bodies, which generally requires compromise and thus dilutes 
preferences. This may be one of the reasons for the relatively less assertive nature of 
European business lobbying compared, for example, to the US. (Woll, 2007) This 
does not of course preclude independent lobbying by major firms, which may in any 
case have a presence across the EU.   
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An increased sensitivity to civil society after the Seattle WTO Ministerial in 1999, 
among other things, led to the establishment of a semi-formal Consultative Forum 
with non-government organizations, including business, sector organizations as well 
as a wide range of civil society NGOs.  The diverse views in such a Consultative 
Forum mean that while it enhances policy transparency it leaves the existing 
technocratic policy making machinery of Commission, Art 133 and Council largely 
untouched. Civil society NGO advocacy does however, have an indirect impact on 
EU trade policy by shaping public opinion that has begun to translate into greater 
parliamentary scrutiny.  The EP is also more open to civil society lobbying so that a 
greater role for the EP looks likely to translate into a larger role for NGOs. 
 
The Council adopts the results but the role of the EP is growing  
The Council adopts the eventual results of each negotiation.  National ministers are 
normally present at key stages of a major negotiation to provide final instructions and 
to endorse last minute agreements and compromises. Formal adoption then follows in 
the GAERC under the QMV rule on issues within EU competence, although in 
practice the Council operates by consensus, at least as far as major issues affecting 
major member governments are concerned. Smaller member states may be bought-off 
with side payments.  Unanimity is required for the adoption of provisions that fall 
within national or mixed competence, which are then subject to ratification at MS 
level including by national parliaments.15 Clearly a formal requirement of unanimity 
strengthens the negotiating position of a MS or a minority of MSs opposed to any 
given EU policy option, even though all decisions are ultimately taken by consensus. 
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Under existing treaty provisions the EP must give its assent, by a simple majority, if a 
trade agreement; (a) requires changes in EU internal legislation adopted by co-
decision making; (b) establishes specific institutional obligations (such as a joint 
parliamentary body or committee); or (c) has budgetary implications.  Unless a 
multilateral trade agreement is very limited it is likely to require EP assent under one 
or other of these conditions. For political reasons it would also be difficult for the 
Council not to seek EP assent. 16 
 
As noted above bilateral association agreements under Art 310 TEC, the type of 
agreement used for all major bilateral agreements to date, require unanimity within 
the Council and the assent of the EP.17 This can clearly affect the policy process by 
strengthening the position of a MS that wishes to block an agreement and making it 
more important for the Commission and Council to keep the EP ‘on board’. At 
present the EP has no real credible veto power over multilateral agreements. If all 154 
members of the WTO and all the 27 EU Member States have agreed on the outcome 
of, for example, the DDA, it is difficult to see how the EP could vote such an 
agreement down. Nor has the political composition been such that any agreement 
negotiated by the Commission and approved by the MS could not get a majority. The 
rejection of a bilateral agreement, such as an EPA between the EU and an ACP state 
or region, is both legally and politically more likely..18 The EP has shown 
considerable interest in aspects of bilateral agreements, such as human rights 
conditions in the EU trading partners. But there must still be some doubt that the EP 
will decline to give its assent or consent to a bilateral agreement that has been 
negotiated, accepted by all 27 Member States and adopted by a democratic body in 
the trading partner.    
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Figure x 2 EU decision-making for bilateral association agreements 
 
Commercial instruments  
Anti-dumping has been by far the most important commercial instrument used by the 
EU. GATT Article VI lays down rules that are implemented in EU regulations. These 
regulations are currently adopted by the Council following a proposal by the 
Commission, in other words not by co-decision making.  An anti-dumping complaint 
is triggered by a claim from the EU sector concerned that imports are dumped and 
causing - or threaten to cause - ‘serious injury.’ The complaint office in DG Trade of 
the Commission receives such petitions for relief and considers the general validity of 
the complaint.  At this stage there may well be informal communications between the 
industry or lawyers representing the industry and the Commission on the strength of 
the case. If the Commission is persuaded there is sufficient evidence it seeks approval 
from the Anti-Dumping Committee to begin an investigation.  The Anti-Dumping 
Committee is chaired by the Commission and includes generally representatives from 
the permanent representations in Brussels and national capitals. Approval to 
investigate requires a simple majority of MS voting.  
 
The Commission is then fully responsible for establishing; (a) if dumping has 
occurred, (b) whether there is serious injury as a result, (c) causality, in other words 
injury must be result from dumping and (c) where the ‘Community interest’ lies. 
GATT Art IV is not tightly drawn and the Commission has a good measure of 
discretion on dumping and injury and even more on Community interest, which 
requires an assessment of the costs to consumers and other user industries- and 
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benefits - for the injured industry - of imposing anti-dumping duties. In cases of 
dumping the Commission may propose  preliminary duties, which require a simple 
majority of the MS in the Anti-dumping Committee, but COREPER/the Council must 
approve the definitive duties, which can run for up to five years. Broader policy issues 
relating to the use of anti-dumping or other forms of contingent protection, such as the 
use of restraint in the use of commercial instruments during the international 
economic downturn following the 2008 financial crisis, may also be discussed in the 
Commercial Questions Group of COREPER. But the Commission has had some 
success in limiting the role of this Presidency chaired committee. 
 
In recent years the EU procedures have been changed to make it easier to have a 
definitive duty adopted thus increasing the ‘effectiveness’ of using commercial 
instruments for the purpose of contingent protection.  In 1994 the threshold for 
adopting a definitive duty was lowered from QMV to a simple majority of MS.19 
When the 2004 enlargement promised to make it harder to get a simple majority in 
favour of action due to abstentions, 20 a further change was made to the effect that a 
Commission proposal for a definitive duty now stands unless there is a simple 
majority of MS against it.21 The Commission’s responsibility for implementing anti-
dumping policy therefore gives it considerable discretionary power.  In the past this 
has been criticized as providing scope to use anti-dumping duties as a form of 
contingent protection.  In 2008 DG Trade was however, accused by industry of using 
its discretion to hinder the process of adopting anti-dumping measures.  Finally, it is 
perhaps worth stressing that unlike most other decisions on trade when it comes to the 
use of commercial instruments, such as anti-dumping duties, it is common practice to 
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take votes.  This can lead to active lobbying of small MS without a direct interest in 
the case by the larger MS with important sector interests at stake.   
 
Figure x.3 EU decision-making for anti-dumping measures  
 
On final aspect of EU trade policy concerns the day-to-day implementation of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. This involves work in the various WTO 
committees and bilateral joint committees or councils, as well as the use of formal 
dispute settlement procedures. Most disputes are resolved in consultations between 
the Commission for the EU and the relevant trading partner. However, there is a 
greater use of adjudication in dispute settlement, especially in the WTO. The EU has 
won several important WTO cases including the US safeguard actions on steel, and 
the US Foreign Sales Corporation Tax (FSC), but it also lost some, such as the 
bananas, genetically modified organisms (GMO) and beef hormones cases.  In cases 
where the EU is accused of non-compliance it is the Commission that submits the EU 
case and represents the EU in any hearings.  Decisions on whether to bring a case in 
the WTO are generally taken by the Commission, but with the backing of the Article 
133 Committee. Challenging another WTO member under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) can be seen as an aggressive step, especially when losing the 
case carries major costs or requires changes in policy or legislation, such as in the 
FSC case; in these instances decisions are taken by the Council (Petersmann and 
Pollack, 2003). 
 
EU trade strategy in the post Uruguay Round period 
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This section considers the more substantive question of how the EU has responded to 
the lack of progress in the multilateral Doha Development Agenda by reemphasizing 
bilateral and (at least rhetorically) region-to-region agreements.  In 1999 the EU 
adopted what was a de facto moratorium on new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
in order not to undermine the credibility of its push for a comprehensive multilateral 
round. (Lamy, 2004) The EU pursued its aim of a comprehensive multilateral agenda 
and WTO Working Groups on competition, investment public procurement and trade 
facilitation were established at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial. In 1998 the Clinton 
Administration agreed, rather reluctantly, to support the EU-led proposal for a 
millennium round, but the attempt to launch one in Seattle in December 1999 failed 
due to developing country and civil society NGO opposition, but most importantly a 
lack of agreement between the EU and US on the negotiating aims. At the WTO 
Ministerial in Doha in 2001 a new round was launched thanks to the use of the time-
honoured GATT device of constructive ambiguity in the agenda, a more supportive 
US position in the post 9/11 period and EU work on the Doha Declaration on TRIPs 
and essential medicines, adoption of which was a key condition for developing 
country support. (European Commission, 2004)  
 
Movement in the EU position on agriculture compared to the 1980s was reflected in 
the fact that a joint EU – US paper on agriculture could be agreed in the run up to the 
2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial meeting. (Woolcock, 2005)  But this joint paper 
provoked developing countries, led by India and Brazil, to form the G20 coalition in 
order to counter what they saw as an attempt to extend the US-EU duopoly of the 
trading system.  With India and other G20 members opposing a comprehensive round 
and seeking more on agriculture than either the EU or US was ready to offer, the 
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Cancun Ministerial collapsed even though the EU had taken its key ‘Singapore’ issues 
off the agenda as part of an effort to save the negotiations. This was a major setback 
for the EU. The EU retained a preference for multilateralism, but there was a growing 
debate within the Commission and among the MS on the option of negotiating new 
preferential agreements, not least because the EU’s major trading partners/competitors 
were engaging in active FTA strategies. In a policy statement in November 2003, the 
Commission articulated the view that the DDA remained the priority and but FTAs 
would not be ruled out, if they offered clear economic benefits and, in cases of region-
to-region agreements, the EU’s partners showed evidence of progress towards 
regional integration. (European Commission, 2003, pg 16) By March and April 2006 
a broad consensus in favour of a more active FTA policy emerged, more as a result of 
the ongoing dialogue in the 133 Committee in response to developments in 
international trade negotiations, than of pressure from any specific sector or lobby. 
(Elsig, 2007) The formal EU policy statement formed part of the Global Europe 
strategy paper of October 2006. (European Commission, 2006). 
 
There were three main reasons this shift in policy.  First, there was the lack of 
progress in the DDA, both in comprehensiveness and ambition on mainstream topics 
such as Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) (i.e. tariff) negotiations and 
services. 
 
Second, there was the policy shift in other major WTO members towards more active 
FTA strategies. In 2000 China’s approached ASEAN with a view to negotiating 
preferential agreements. There were also the ASEAN plus 3 talks including China, 
South Korea and Japan.22  Japan began negotiating New Era Economic Partnership 
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Agreements and perhaps most important of all the US pursued an active ‘competitive 
liberalisation’ policy once the Bush Administration obtained Trade Promotion 
Authority in 2001. The US was soon negotiating FTAs with Central America, 
Thailand, Korea, the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), as well as seeking to 
conclude the FTAA. (Evenett, 2007)  These FTAs offered better access to some major 
markets for the EU’s competitors and therefore led to pressure from European 
industry and particularly the service sector for the EU to negotiate equivalent access 
via FTAs if the DDA was not going to deliver.  Many FTAs, in particular those 
negotiated by the United States also included such trade-related topics as 
comprehensive investment provisions, government procurement, a wide range of 
service sectors, TRIPs – plus intellectual property rights as well as elements of labour 
and environmental policy.   
 
A third, related reason for the shift was that many EU preferential agreements were 
more foreign policy or development than commercially driven. For example, the 
Stability and Adjustment Agreements (SAAs) with the Balkan states were primarily 
motivated by a desire to promote economic and political stability in the region. 
Similarly the EuroMed Association agreements were aimed at promoting economic 
growth to counter the political instability and the rise of fundamentalism in that 
region.  The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the ACP states, which 
together accounted for only 4% of EU exports, were motivated, for the most part, by 
development aims. Only the FTAs with Mexico and Chile, both of which were 
negotiated to counter the trade diversionary effects of US FTAs, and perhaps the 
Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa, could be said to 
have been with emerging markets. 
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Conclusions 
Until well into the mid 1990s EU trade policy decision making could be with 
confidence characterized as technocratic and rather opaque, with Commission and 
Member State trade officials in the Art 133 Committee doing much of the work and 
Ministers in the GAERC making key political decisions and providing democratic 
legitimacy.  This facilitated efficiency by keeping trade policy at arms length from 
political and protectionist forces.  National and EU policy interests were based on 
largely informal contacts with the private sector interests.  
 
Over time the EU’s trade policy stance shifted from a largely defensive response to a 
US- led trade agenda to a more proactive and liberal policy that embraced the rules-
based multilateral system. This shift came about largely as a result of ‘domestic’ 
changes within the EU in the form of the creation of the single European market.  
 
Since the latter half of the 1990s EU trade policy has had to face a number of 
challenges. Globalisation has led to a broader, more intrusive agenda that has 
provoked a much greater public debate on trade agenda. This has in turn led to 
pressure for more transparent and accountable trade policy decision-making.  
Enlargement has taken EU membership from 12 during the Uruguay Round to 27. 
This has brought with it the challenge of accommodating a wider range of interests in 
the EU’s common commercial policy. Finally, there have been systemic changes. 
Despite the success of the Uruguay Round and the creation and increase in 
membership of the WTO to the point that is it now effectively a global organization, 
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the trading system has become multi-polar in nature.  There is no longer US 
leadership of a multilateral agenda, or even a shared US-EU duopoly.  
 
In terms of EU decision-making the response to these challenges has been a 
consolidation of the ‘Brussels-based’ decision-making process.  This has come about 
for a number of reasons. First, the development of the acquis with more common 
policies means that EU trade policy is based more and more on genuine common 
positions, rather than the sum of national offensive and defensive interests.  This has 
had the effect of reducing, to some extent, the necessity for national trade 
administrations to be fully active across all sectors and topics. National trade policy 
can focus more on a set of priorities rather than work through every last detail of each 
trade topic. As a consequence the Commission has gained de facto competence 
because as negotiator it must master all topics in great detail. The Commission has 
also maintained a greater institutional memory than many national trade 
administrations as national governments have tended to reduce the human resources 
devoted to trade policy.  
 
The challenge of enlargement has not led to reduced ‘efficiency’ in terms of an ability 
to arrive a common trade policy positions or a weakening of the role of the Brussels 
decision-making machinery. The new Member States have in accepting the acquis 
largely fallen into line with the prevailing EU trade policies as well.  The larger Art 
133 Committee has also not weakened and may possibly have strengthened the 
position of the Commission.  The smaller new Member States tend to focus on the 
few sectors or policies of direct interest to them in trade policy and for the rest 
provide broad support for the Commission. In this way they can hope to acquire the 
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political capital they need to get Commission support on those limited issues that are 
important to them. The size of the Art 133 Committee with 27 participants inevitably 
means less time for MS to thrash out differences and tends to place more emphasis on 
the Commission to work out balanced positions that the MS can support.  As dialogue 
between the Member States has become more difficult in the larger 133, the dialogue 
has shifted to one between the Commission and the Member States. When it comes to 
the application of commercial instruments, such as anti-dumping, the Commission has 
always had a good deal of discretion on the application of such instruments, which it 
has been able to use to control policy. This does not mean, of course, that dialogue 
does not influence policy or that lobbying and coalition building within the various 
committees and Councils does not occur.  On some issues there remain sharp 
differences between MS.  
 
The response to the pressures for greater transparency and accountability for trade 
policy has not led to a renationalization of trade policy.  The Commission has 
responded by creating the Consultative Forum for civil society, which has gone some 
way towards addressing the criticism of the civil society about the opaque nature of 
EU policy-making but without ceding any control. There has also been a progressive 
but still limited enhancement of the role of the European Parliament in scrutinizing 
trade policy. This has taken the form of a strengthening of the EPs capacity, such as 
through the creation of a specialist trade committee and by an increased willingness of 
the Commission and Council to consult with the EP.  The INTA gets broadly the same 
information the Art 133 Committee does.  The EP does not have a de facto or credible 
veto power over multilateral trade agreements. It has little say in setting the policy 
aims and is very unlikely to vote down an agreement accepted by all 27 EU Member 
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States, not to mention all 154 WTO Members. The EP veto power may be more 
credible for bilateral FTAs or region-to-region agreements, but here also it is difficult 
to see how the EP would not grant its assent to agreements accepted by all 27 Member 
States and the EU’s trading partners. The Commission (and Council) do however, 
take the EP more seriously than they did in the past.  The EP is also more accessible 
for non-state actors, whether of EU or third country origin.  The net effect of this has 
been a slow, but steady shift towards the EP as the body to provide democratic 
scrutiny of EU trade policy.  This shift would be much greater and much quicker if 
the Lisbon Treaty were to be ratified because this grants more powers to the EP and 
places all trade policy within EU competence, thus doing away with mixed 
competence and dispensing with the need for national parliaments to ratify parts of 
trade agreements.  
 
In terms of the systemic shift towards a multi-polar trading system the EU has moved 
to adopt a multi-level trade policy, much as other WTO Members have, once the 
limited ability of the EU to shape the multilateral agenda alone became apparent.  EU 
trade strategy in this context is dependent on developments elsewhere.  If its major 
trading partners deemphasized FTAs or do not ratify agreements, the pressure on the 
EU to conclude FTAs will be less.  Progress at the multilateral level will also help to 
restore EU interest in the WTO, but the expectation must be that bilateral trade 
agreements will remain a central feature of the trading system for some time to come. 
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It remains to be seen whether the EU will be successful in its bilateral and region-to-
region negotiations. The litmus test here will be the EU – ASEAN and EU- India 
negotiations. If the EU can persuade these FTA partners to accept WTO-plus market 
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access and trade-related provisions on investment, competition and transparency in 
government procurement or cooperation in other trade related topics such as technical 
barriers to trade, then it will have a real impact on the evolution of trade rules.  Whilst 
the policy of negotiating region-to-region agreements makes sense from a normative 
point of view, using access to the EU market to promote greater regional integration 
in other regions has proved to be of little success to date because it is hostage to 
progress towards integration in the partner region.  
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1 Most favoured nation tariff means what it says. If a country negotiates a lower tariff 
with one country than any other that country becomes its most favoured nation. Under 
Article 1 of the GATT this tariff must then be offered to all other countries.  Thus 
lower MFN tariffs would mean a lower preference for other EU Member States.  
When the Treaty of Rome was signed the preference for other Member States was 
seen as central to building Europe. 
  
2 The EU has made extensive use preferential agreements, but these have served (soft) 
security (Europe Agreements with central and eastern European states in the 1990s 
and the Stability and Adjustment Agreements with the Balken states in the 2000s) and 
development (Lome, Cotonou and Economic Partnership Agreements with the 
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African, Caribbean and Pacific states) aims rather than the commercial aim of 
increased access to emerging markets.   
 
3  Formally it is the European Community (EC) according to TEC that is competent 
for external trade, but this chapter uses EU because of the increasing use of EU.  
 
4 The treaties actually refer to common commercial policy, which is a rather more 
fitting title than trade given that ‘trade’ today includes a range of trade-related topics 
such as investment, but ‘trade’ is used here because this is the more common usage. 
   
5  The reference here is to formal or de jure competence according to which 
community competence means that the provisions governing the respective roles of 
the Member States and the European Commission and other EU institutions comes 
into play.  Community competence does not mean the European Commission decides.  
In practice the Commission has however, acquired more and more de facto 
competence in negotiating trade agreements. 
 
6 The Treaty of Lisbon would formally replace European Community competence 
with European Union competence.  
 
7 MSs concerned about sensitive sectors such as audio visual, health and educational  
services inserted safeguards according to which unanimity would be required should 
trade negotiations threaten cultural and linguistic diversity or the effective provision 
of national health, education and social policies. (Woolcock, 2008) 
 
8  For a discussion of how the EU position on trade in telecommunications services 
developed through dialogue within the Council, see Niemann (2006) 
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9 Although the Nordic and eastern enlargements came after the Uruguay Round states 
seeking accession to the EU were more or less obliged to bring their trade policies in 
line with EU policies before accession.  
 
10 Generalisations concerning how liberal or mercantilist/protectionist Member States 
are must be treated with some care.  However, Sweden has shown itself to be on the 
liberal end of the EU spectrum on almost all issues. 
 
11 As noted above the existing treaty provisions differentiate between multilateral and 
bilateral negotiations.  When it comes to the policy process the differences are not 
very great, but this section nevertheless distinguishes between multilateral and 
bilateral negotiations. 
 
12 Although trade policy generally conforms to the ‘Community method’ of policy 
making there are a few imperfections. First, the MS do sometimes place issues on the 
agenda of the 133 Committee or Council meetings (Johnson, 1998, pg 27) and second, 
the role of the EP should arguably be greater for a true Community method. 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) 
 
13  In it’s opinion of the Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament’s International Trade 
Committee (INTA) argued for some means of setting ‘preconditions’ for  the ultimate 
EP consent for any negotiated trade agreement and suggested that the Framework 
Agreement on cooperation between the Commission and Parliament could be the 
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vehicle for such an input from the EP.  European Parliament 2008/2063(INI) 27th May 
2008 
 
14  The Art 133 Committee at the level of ‘titulaire’ (i.e. chief trade official level) is a 
senior level body.  Whilst COREPER can consider trade issues, most EU 
Ambassadors of the Member States prefer to leave the trade issues to their trade 
colleagues in the 133.   
 
15 The ToL in doing away with mixed competence would remove the formal 
unanimity requirement as well as the need for ratification by MS parliaments. Whilst 
this appears a radical departure, in practice ratification by the MS has generally been a 
rubber-stamping exercise. Rather than represent a veto power over trade policy it has 
allowed MS to use the delay of the implementation of important trade agreements as 
leverage in intra-EU bargaining on other issues.   
 
 
16 The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty would further strengthen the powers of the EP to 
give its ‘consent’ of the EP for all trade agreements (Art 218(6)(a) LT) 
 
17 Bilateral trade agreements that fall entirely under EU competence would not, under 
the current treaty provisions, require the EP to grant its assent, although again the 
Commission and Council are likely to consider such assent as politically necessary for 
major agreements.   
 
18  Art 218(6)(a) ToL that would introduce a common procedure for all international 
negotiations undertaken by the EU would confirm the powers of the EP to grant its 
‘consent’ (formerly ‘assent’) for all trade agreements. 
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19 (Council Regulation 522/94).   
 
20 Smaller new MS tend to abstain unless they are directly affected. (Molyneux, 
1999). 
 
 
21 The adoption of the ToL would give the EP joint power with the Council to define 
the ‘framework for implementing external trade policy’ including the EU’s rules on 
commercial instruments such as anti-dumping, TBR, rules of origin etc. as well as 
unilateral trade instruments such as the GSP schemes. (Art 207(2) ToL) This power 
would relate to the regulations only not the application of the regulations to specific 
cases. 
 
22 It has been argued that this was indeed more talk than substance, but Japan and 
even India began to conclude comprehensive economic cooperation agreements that 
went beyond tariffs. (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009)  
 
23  See Heydon and Woolcock 2009 who argue, for example, that the US will continue 
to pursue a competitive liberalization strategy, despite the change of administration in 
2009.  
 
 
